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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY 
a n d / o r STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
- v -
DEE ANNA KENNER, Widow, and 
ADAM LEON KENNER and DAWN 
MARIE KENNER, minor dependent 
children of RICHARD KENNER, 
Deceased, and/or INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Applicants-Respondents, 
Case No. 20048 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 3, 1982, Richard Kenner ("Decendent") was 
killed in an industrial accident while working for Trail Mountain 
Coal Company ("Trial Mountain"). The Decedent left three 
dependents (hereinafter referred to as "Dependents"), his wife 
Dee Anna De Graffenreid-Kenner ("Wife"), and two minor children 
("Children"), Dawn Marie Kenner ("Dawn")—then age thirteen, and 
Adam Leon Kenner ("Adam")—then age 15. (R.12). Trail Mountain 
at the death of Decedent was subject to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of Utah ("the Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-1 ££. 
£j£g.. (R.12). 
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Trail Mountain and i t s indus tr ia l insurance carr i er , 
the State Insurance Fund, admitted l i a b i l i t y for the death of 
Decedent and submitted a request t o the Industr ia l Commission 
("the Commission") t o award compensation to Dependents. (R.12)• 
The Commission, pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-6 8 (Supp. 
1983) , awarded Dependents the maximum b e n e f i t s a l lowable , 
$68 ,016 .00 , payable over the maximum statutory period of 312 
weeks at the rate of $218 per week. (R.12) . 
Wife remarried on September 7, 1982, which occasioned a 
modif icat ion of the or ig ina l b e n e f i t s payment plan. Pursuant t o 
Utah Code Ann. § 35 -1 -73 , the Commission modified the award by 
granting Wife her s tatutory Fi f ty- two week lump sum payment and 
d iv id ing the remainder of the or ig ina l award between the 
Children. (R.17, 18, 20, 21) . At the date of remarriage, 215 
days had e lapsed s ince Decedent's death, or 30.7143 weeks 
(214 /7 ) . Based upon such, $6,695.65 should have been paid to 
Dependents. Nevertheless , Dependents had been paid $13 ,796 .28 . 
(R.17) . Consequently, the Commission o f f s e t the d i f ference 
between the $13,796.28 and $6 ,695 .65 , or $7 ,100 .63 , against 
Wife's s ta tutory award of $11,336.00 (52 x $218). As a r e s u l t , 
Wife received a cash payment of $4,235.37 ($11,336.00 -
$ 7 , 1 0 0 . 6 3 ) . (R.17 ,20) . The remaining balance of the o r i g i n a l 
award ($68 ,016 .00 ) , $49,984.35 ($68,016.00 - $13,796.28 -
$ 4 , 2 3 5 . 3 7 ) , was awarded to Children, payable t o t r u s t fund 
accounts e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e i r names with the Utah State Credit 
Union. Each was t o rece ive $801.96 every four weeks—$401.98 t o 
each individual account. 
- 2 -
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On January 21
 f 1985 r the Administrative Law Judge 
entered an order, pursuant t o request , r e l eas ing the funds in 
Adam's account. (R.25) . Thereafter, Appellants moved for 
recons iderat ion of the order. 
On March 1 4 , 1985, the Administrative Law Judge, in 
response t o Appellants motion, amended anew the "Modification of 
Award Upon Remarriage". Therein, the Administrative Law Judge, 
pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-73 and 35-1-74 (Supp. 1983), 
affirmed the equal d i s t r i b u t i o n made of the $49,984.35 (the 
or ig ina l modified award) and r e t r o a c t i v e l y modified the payments 
Dawn and Adam were t o be paid t o , r e s p e c t i v e l y , $122.85 and 
$202.48 per week. (R.37) . The Administrative Law Judge based 
h i s d e c i s i o n l a r g e l y on equi tab le grounds. Such grounds were 
apparently supported by two l e t t e r s which indicated that Adam 
Kenner needs continued support to allow him to serve a mission <\ 
for the L.D.S. Church and t o attend c o l l e g e . (R.33 ,35) . 
The Industr ia l Commission, in response to a Motion for 
Review of the March 14 , 1985 order, affirmed the order entered by 
the Administrative Law Judge and adopted h i s f indings of fact and 
conclus ions of law. (R.47) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellate review of the dec i s ion at i s sue in t h i s case 
extends only t o making a determination whether the Commission 
reasonably interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-73 (Supp. 1983) . 
A Commission in terpre ta t ion i s given greater deference 
when the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n invo lves a law which the Commission i s 
required t o administer. Sect ion 35-1-73 i s c l e a r l y a law which 
the Commission i s required to administer. 
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The Commission's interpretation of § 35-1-73 is 
reasonablef and therefore beyond appellate review, if it achieves 
the purposess of the Act and does not conflict with the terms of 
the statute. 
The Commission interpreted § 35-1-73 to grant authority 
to make whatever disposition equity required of the benefits 
payable after remarriage to the dependent children of Mr. Kenner. 
The Commission, in large part, was motivated by the fact that 
Adam Kenner desired to serve a full-time mission for the L.D.S. 
Church and to attend college and through education increase his 
potential for earning a livlihood in our society. Adamf no 
doubt, if his father had not been killed by the admitted 
negligence of his employer, Trail Mountain, would have had those 
opportunities. 
Under these circumstances, the Commission reasonably 
interpreted § 35-1-73. Therefore the Commission's decision 
should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THIS CASE IS LIMITED TO 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE COMMISSION REASONABLY 
INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-73 (SUPP. 
1983) 
Judicial review of commission findings and conclusions 
is limited. In Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)f this Court ennunciated and explained 
the standards of review applicable to decisions of the Public 
Service Commission. Since then the Court has applied those 
standards generally/ and has applied them specifically to 
-4-
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decisions of the Industrial Commission. E.g., Van Waters & 
Rogers v- Workman. 700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985). In Utah Dept. Of 
Admin. Serv.. three standards of appellate review were explained, 
namely, "General Law—Correction of Error," "Findings of Fact— 
Evidence of Any Substance Whatever," and "Other Decisions— 
Reasonableness or Rationality." Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. at 
607-09. Only the latter standard is applicable in this case. 
The Court explained the "Other Decisions—Reasonableness or 
Rationality" standard as follows: 
Between the foregoing extremes of no 
deference on questions of general law and the 
greatest deference on questions of basic fact 
are a variety of issues on which Commission 
decisions are entitled to weight, but are ^ 
subject to judicial review to assure that i jlt^ N 
they fall within the limits of reasonableness \ A(M 
or rationality. \ J^ 
• • • • /^ ^~~~y \ \^ 
Also among t he se i n t e r m e d i a t e i s s u e s a r e C/*4 
t h e Commission's d e c i s i o n s o n what can be 
c a l l e d q u e s t i o n s of " s p e c i a l l aw." These a r e 
t he Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
o p e r a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s of the s t a t u t o r y law i t 
i s empowered t o a d m i n i s t e r , e s p e c i a l l y those 
g e n e r a l i z e d terms t h a t bespeak a l e g i s l a t i v e 
i n t e n t t o d e l e g a t e t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o 
t h e r e s p o n s i b l e agency. 
I d . a t 609 , 610. 
The Commission's d e c i s i o n a t i s sue in t h i s case 
i n v o l v e s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " s p e c i a l law" as def ined above. 
The Commission i s e x c l u s i v e l y r e s p o n s i b l e for hear ing and 
d e c i d i n g workmen's compensation c a s e s . See United S t a t e s 
Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. v. Evans, 35 F.2d 459, £ext. den. 
281 U.S. 744 (1929). A for t ior i i t i s exclusively responsible Po 
for interpret ing the Act. 
- 5 -
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The Administrative Law Judge, and the Commission by 
affirmation, interpreted § 35-1-73 so as to allow significant 
discretion in disposing of the remaining benefits payable as 
required by the circumstances. If that interpretation is 
reasonable, the Commissions decision is beyond review. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSIONS INTEPRETATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-73 (SUPP. 1983) IS REASONABLE AND 
FURTHERS THE PURPOSES OF THE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT. 
Interpretations of "special law11 enjoy a limited degree 
of deference; administrative interpretations of "special law" 
must be upheld if within the bounds of reasonableness or 
rationality. In Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv.. the Court defined 
the degree of deference accorded such interpretations: 
The degree of deference extended to the 
decisions of the Commission on these 
intermediate types of issues has been given 
various expressions, but all are variations 
of the idea that the Commission's decisions 
must fall within the limits of reasonableness 
or rationality. 
. . . . 
When the decision being reviewed 
represents the agency1s weighing of competing 
values to select a particular goalf its 
interpretation of a special lawf . . . judicial review necessarily involves an 
independent judgment of the reasonableness of 
the agency decision. In these circumstances, 
reasonableness is measured against a specific 
standard: "The reasonableness of the 
Commission's order must be determined in 
light of the statutory setting in which it 
operates." [Citations ommittedl Thusf 
reasonableness must be determined with 
reference to the specific terms of the 
underlying legislation, interpreted in light 
of its evident purpose as revealed in the 
legislative history and in light of the 
public policy sought to be served. 
-6-
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Utah Dept. of Admint Serv« at 610, 611. 
Thus, the Commissions order in t h i s case must be 
deemed reasonable i f the goal or purpose of the order and that of 
the Act genera l ly are congruous and the order does not c o n f l i c t 
with the s p e c i f i c terms of the s ta tu te construed. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act "is a bene f i c i en t lawf 
passed t o protect employees and those dependent upon them; . . . 
and to provide workmen's dependents with something in 
s u b s t i t u t i o n for what they l o s t by the workmen's death." EajLk 
Utah Console Mines Co, v. Industr ia l Comm. , 84 Utah 481 f 36 P.2d 
979, 981 (1934) . Although the general ru le s of s ta tutory 
construct ion are appl icable to the construct ion of the Act, 
Industrial Commission v. Daly Mining Co>, 108 Utah l , 172 p. 301 
(1918); Or^tega v. Sa l t Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 51 Utah 602, 156 
P.2d 885 (1916) , the Act should be l i b e r a l l y construed in favor 
of the dependents of injured or k i l l e d workmen and any doubt 
respect ing the r ight to compensation should be construed in favor 
of the dependents. Frandsen v. Industr ia l Comm.f 61 Utah 354, 
213 P. 197 (1923); Ogden City v. Industrial Comm,. 57 Utah 221, 
193 P. 857 (1920); Chandler v. Industr ia l Comm,, 55 Utah 213, 184 
P. 1020 (1919) . 
I t i s e a s i l y seen that the Commission's ac t ions in t h i s 
case and the purposes therefor are congruous with the s tatutory 
requirements and purposes of the Act. The Commission modified 
the award upon remarriage to compensate Adam Kenner for something 
he l o s t by h i s f a t h e r ' s death—the r ight and p r i v i l e g e to attend 
c o l l e g e and go on a miss ion. Furthermore, the Commission 
l i b e r a l l y construed § 35-1-73 in favor of Adam Kenner. 
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Moreoverf the Commission's interpretation does not 
conflict with the specific terms of § 35-1-73, nor does it 
conflict with other provisions of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-73 (Supp. 1983) in pertinent provides: 
If there are other dependents [other 
that the spouse] remaining at the time of 
remarriage, benefits payable under this title 
shall be paid to such person as the 
commission may determine for the use and 
benefit of the other dependentsf the weekly 
benefits to be paid at intervals of not less 
than four weeks. 
Defining "benefits payable under this title" is 
critical to understanding whether the Commission's interpretation 
conflicts with this or other provisions of the Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-68(2)(b)(i) (Supp. 1983) specifies what benefits are 
payable to dependents of workmen killed by industrial accidents 
occurring at the time of Decedent's death. That section reads: 
If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment by the 
employer or insurance carrier sha l l be 66 
2/3% of the decedent ' s average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the s t a t e average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week 
. . .
 f to continue during dependency for the 
remainder of the period between the date of 
the death and not t o exceed s i x years or 312 
weeks af ter the date of the injury. 
The Commission determined the maximum amount payable 
under t h i s s e c t i o n t o be $68,016.00 ($218 x 312 weeks) . The f u l l 
$68,016.00 was payable and was within the d e f i n i t i o n of "benef i ts 
payable under t h i s T i t l e " as s ta ted in § 35 -1 -73 . Of course, one 
condi t ion i s mentioned in § 3 5 - 1 - 6 8 ( 2 ) ( b ) ( i ) , namely, that the 
\ 4 ' -'•'• v 
dependent remaifyydepehdent. ( AAAAAJ^ (3 ) 
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Appellants object that § 35-1-73 must be construed in 
light of § 35-1-74 (Supp. 1983). However, § 35-1-74 is, by its 
terms, applicable only when dependency ceases or the child 
reaches the age of majority, and is therefore not violated. 
Section 35-1-/4 does not apply in this case because Adam received 
his entire award before reaching the age of eighteen. Indeed, 
Adam's increased award satisfies § 35-1-/4 because it ceases at 
age eighteen. 
What is really at issue in this case is the procedure 
for determining dependency. Section 35-l-71-(2) (Supp. 1983) X 
provides that the "question of dependency, in whole or in part, 
shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each 
particular case . . . ." The Administrative Law Judge had before 
him two letters that indicated the continuing nature of Adamfs 
dependency. Based upon these and the inequity of terminating 
Adam's benefits at a critical time in his life, the 
Administrative Law Judge devised a method of achieving a laudable 
result—a result that furthers the purposes of the Act. 
Appellants herein did not offer evidence to the contrary and 
cannot now be heard to complain of the award granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's order at issue herein should be 
affirmed. The order furthers the purposes of the Act and is a 
valid exercise of the Commission's broad discretion to provide 
for the dependents of workmen killed in industrial accidents. 
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DATED this 1 i* day of September, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
RALPH I>. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing "Brief .ofx^ he Attorney General" were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this \\p day of September, 1985 to James R. Black, 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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